In regards to The Fort Garry's, 'B' and 'C' Squadrons operated the D.D.s and 'A' Squadron retained normal Shermans. 'B' Squadron supported The Queen's Own Rifles of Canada and 'C' Squadron supported the North Shore (New Brunswick) Regiment.

While the D.D.s of the 1st Hussars were launched further out at sea in support of 7th Infantry Brigade, the D.D.s of The Fort Garry's, in support of 8th Infantry Brigade, left their L.C.T.s close in-shore due to the roughness of the sea. Nevertheless, the D.D. equipment was inflated and the tanks used their propellers in the landing. The first tanks of The Fort Garry's touched down at approximately 0810 hrs, 06 June 1944.

Transcribed including original spellings and punctuation, 13 Feb 1994.

10 CDN ARMD REGT (FORT GARRY HORSE)

21 Jun 44

2 Cdn Armd Bde

REPORT ON EMPLOYMENT OF D.D. TKS IN THE

ASSAULT

1. GENERAL As a result of the Regiment's experience in the recent landing and the training prior thereto the following notes are compiled. The 1 Hussars were launched much further out than this Regt; due to the decision reached by D.S.O.A.G. Comdr R.E.D. Ryder V.C. - concurred in by the Sqn Ldr., "B" and "C" were put off very near the beach. Hence the other Regt experienced coming in on a heavy sea and arriving on the beach short of Tks due to founderings. Personally, I agree with the D.S.O.A.G's decision not to risk the tks and mind that only one L.C.T. was damaged by shell fire in consequence causing the loss of two D.D. Tks as a result. With more infm recently, it is now possible to make a Report, up to the time of touching down upon the beach.

2. TRG PRIOR TO OP Basic Trg sound. Too much time spent at "B" Wing in "Launchings". Attempts were made to create a record no. per diem. Thus practice in navigation with and without compass and periscope was insufficient. The RN. - "N" Sqn L.C.T. were excellent throughout and a close corp was attained before the OP. - this was important. Insufficient land eqpt and time seemed available for these two sqns before the OP they complained that they were getting web footed. Fortunately, sound trg well before the special trg., and every opportunity to get land work caused the two sqns to acquit themselves well on the Day. More attention might have been given Escape Drill incl use of A.T.E.A. and the rubber dinghy.

3. LOADING Carried out satisfactorily. The L.C.T. IV is to be preferred to the III, as it has a lower ramp before the loading door and Tks can by pass on the deck. In some cases the E.S.O. fussed a bit getting the Tks. and R.N. out of step. These M.C.Os Officers needed more practice with these Tks.

4. LENGTH OF VOYAGE Impossible to arrange but too long for comfort from seasickness. Combined with the effect of the run-in upon the Tk crews, if is a factor to be considered. Quite a few crews arrived on the beach in poor shape - especially the dvrs.

5. INTERCOMN Satisfactory throughout. If was found, however, that the net with A.V.R.E's was not necessary. Afloat, Naval means used.

6. LENGTH OF LAUNCH As noted above, the launch was really a wet wade. Use of screws was, however, necessary and Tks could hardly have got ashore without them. At first it was decided to close to 3000x but as the seas was still rough there, land was further closed by the D.S.O.A.G and the A.V.R.E's were followed in. I consider that the risk to the L.C.T. by so closing was legitimate and that the saving of the Tks proved it. It is considered that 7000x is unnecessarily long, it is not needed to protect the L.C.T. and puts too much strain upon the D.D. crews. Ref paras 4 above and 7 below.

7. AIR AND S.P. A TK BOMBARDMENT The air did not appear to hit St Aubin Sur Mer at all and certainly did not touch on "assigned target" a special strong point which caused loss upon the beach. On the right on NAN WHITE, the effect seemed better. This should be improved.

The S.P. Arty seemed very patchy, again especially upon the left. The great majority of houses looking down upon the beach appeared quite untouched and were later discovered to be full of resolute snipers.

A more thorough or successful preliminary bombardment might have cut down casualties and rendered the D.D. SP task easier. Despite this the L.C.T. were able to launch close with trivial loss.

8. A.V.R.E's Those were originally planned to follow in the D.D. Tks but by Commdr Ryder's orders, they preceded them. They did their work well but took some time to complete gaps. It appeared that they took about 45' on the left and 75' on the Right. On the former fl "C" went through a mine field successfully to save time. This would seem to need improvement.

9. SP DURING RUN-IN Other than the prelim air and the S.P. arty the sp was good. The L.C.G's and the L.C.T. (C.B.) seemed especially helpful. The other types - L.C.T. (R), etc assisted. It is thought that sea borne sp fire by well trained gunners firing close in, directly, on selected objects is very good indeed and could be increased in volume.

Smoke for the actual launch might be useful, provided it was local and did not blind the assault fire.

Rescue Craft for the drowned Tks seemed adequate under the circumstances, the use of their rubber dinghies could be improved by loosing them in the rear decks and tethering them by a long rope to the Tk. They should thus be nearby for the crew when they surfaced.

10. THE RUN-IN Due to the close launching carried out, little was learnt before the actual deep wading on tracks began. As in normal tactics, it is reco that the assault on each Beach be made in two waves. This allows more dispersion afloat, distracts the defence, allows more flexibility of manouvre before beaching and gives a reserve or sp wave.

Well off shore, the C.C. must go under armour 3000x to 2000x and the outside brimacle is not used. This equipment and the time spent in setting it does not seem to be of any real value. In view of this, the dvr should be better equipped with periscope and front vision to drive the craft in himself, it is reco.

The .5" gun that was reco by some, to be fitted to the turret ring socket, to be used during the run-in is not thought to be necessary.